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Abstract 
  This paper investigates a mixed duopoly model in which there is a state-owned firm 
competing with a foreign joint-stock firm. The following situation is considered. In the first 
period, each firm non-cooperatively decides how many it sells in the current market. In 
addition, each firm can hold inventory for the second-period market. By holding large 
inventory, a firm may be able to commit to large sales in the next period. In the second 
period, each firm non-cooperatively chooses its second-period output. At the end of the 
second period, each firm sells its first-period inventory and its second-period output and 
holds no inventory. The paper traces out the firms’ reaction functions in the mixed duopoly 
model. 
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1. Introduction 
  Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) examine a two-period model in which inventory is used by 
a duopoly to deter deviations from an implicitly collusive arrangement, and establish that 
higher inventory allows firms to punish cheaters more strongly and can thus help to maintain 
collusion. Matsumura (1999) presents a Cournot duopoly model with finitely repeated 
competition, and establishes that two-period competition is insufficient to make private firms 
collusive. These studies investigate private duopoly models with inventory as a strategic 
device. Ohnishi (2011) presents a mixed duopoly model in which a welfare-maximizing 
public firm and a profit-maximizing private firm can use inventory investment as a strategic 
device, and demonstrates that the equilibrium coincides with the Stackelberg solution where 
the private firm is the leader. 
  The analysis of mixed oligopoly models that incorporate state-owned public firms has 
been performed by many researchers (e.g., see Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Nett, 1994; 
Willner, 1994; Fjell and Pal, 1996; George and La Manna, 1996; White, 1996; Mujumdar 
and Pal, 1998; Pal, 1998; Pal and White, 1998; Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Nishimori and 
Ogawa, 2002; Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2003; Ohnishi, 2006, 2009; Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007; 
Fernández-Ruiz, 2009; Heywood and Ye, 2010; Wang and Lee, 2010; Pal and Saha, 2014; 
Cracau, 2015). However, these studies consider mixed market models in which state-owned 
firms compete with capitalist or labor-managed firms, and do not include joint-stock firms. 
  Only few studies consider joint-stock firms. For example, Meade (1972) shows the 
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differences in incentives, short-run adjustment and so forth among entrepreneurial, 
co-operative and joint-stock firms. Hey (1981) restricts attention to the case of a perfectly 
competitive firm producing a homogeneous final good with inputs of capital and labor, and 
examines the behavior of profit-maximizing, labor-managed and joint-stock firms. Ohnishi 
(2010b) presents the equilibrium solution of a quantity-setting model comprising a 
joint-stock firm and a profit-maximizing capitalist firm, and shows that introducing lifetime 
employment into the model of quantity-setting duopoly is beneficial only for the joint-stock 
firm. In addition, Ohnishi (2015b) investigates a mixed duopoly model where a joint-stock 
firm and a state-owned firm are allowed to offer lifetime employment as a strategic 
commitment, and presents the equilibrium solution of the mixed duopoly model. 
  We consider a two-period mixed market model in which a state-owned firm and a foreign 
joint-stock firm can hold inventory as a strategic device. The game runs as follows. In period 
one, each firm non-cooperatively decides how many it sells in the current market. In addition, 
each firm non-cooperatively decides the level of inventory it holds for the second-period 
market. In period two, each firm non-cooperatively chooses its output. At the end of period 
two, each firm sells its first-period inventory and its second-period output. We trace out the 
firms’ reaction functions in the mixed duopoly model. 
  The balance of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we describe the 
model. The third section characterizes best replies for firms in the model. The fourth section 
presents the results of this study. The final section concludes the paper. 
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2. The model 
  We consider a mixed duopoly model in which there is a domestic state-owned firm (firm 
D) competing with a foreign joint-stock firm (firm F). In the balance of this paper, subscripts 
D and F refer to firms D and F, respectively, and superscripts 1 and 2 refer to periods 1 and 2, 
respectively. In addition, when i  and j  are used to refer to firms in an expression, they 
should be understood to denote D and F with i j . The duopolists produce perfectly 
substitutable goods. The price of each period is determined by ( )tP S , where D F
t t tS s s  
is the aggregate sales of each period. We assume that ' 0P  and '' 0P . 
  The two periods of the game are as follows. In the first period, each firm 
non-cooperatively and simultaneously decides its first-period production 1 [0, )iq  and its 
first-period sales 1 1[0, ]i is q . Firm i’s inventory 
1
iI  becomes 
1 1
i iq s . In the second period, 
each firm non-cooperatively and simultaneously decides its second-period production 
2 [0, )iq . At the end of the second period, each firm sells 
2 1 2
i i is I q  and holds no 
inventory. For notational simplicity, we consider the game without discounting. 
  Since 2 21 1
t t
t i t iq s , economic welfare is 
    
2 2
D D F D D F0 0
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t tS St t t t t t
t t
W P x dx m q P S q P x dx m s P S s     (1) 
where D (0, )m  denotes firm D’s constant marginal cost. Firm D seeks to maximize (1). 
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The demand and cost conditions that firms face remain unchanged over time. We define 
    D D F0 ( ) ( )
tSt t t tw P x dx m s P S s                                    (2) 
  In addition, since 2 21 F 1 F
t t
t tq s , firm F’s profit per capital is 
    
t2 2
F F F F F F F F
F
1 1F F F F
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
t t t t t t t
t t
t t
P S s m q f P S s m s f
k s k s
               (3) 
where F (0, )m  denotes firm F’s constant marginal cost, F (0, )f  is firm F’s fixed 
cost, and F F( )
tk s  is firm F’s capital input function. Firm F aims to maximize (3). 
  We assume that F F( )
tk s  is the function of F
ts  with F 0k  and F 0k . This 
assumption means that the marginal quantity of capital used is increasing. 
  We also assume that firm D is less efficient than firm F, i.e. D Fm m . This assumption is 
justified in Gunderson (1979) and Nett (1993, 1994), and is often used in literature studying 
mixed oligopoly markets (e.g., see George and La Manna, 1996; Mujumdar and Pal, 1998; 
Pal, 1998; Nishimori and Ogawa, 2002; Matsumura, 2003; Ohnishi, 2006, 2015a; 
Fernández-Ruiz, 2009). If firm D is equally or more efficient than firm F, then firm D 
chooses D
tq  and D
ts  such that price equals marginal cost. Therefore, firm F has no 
incentive to operate in the market, and firm D acts as a monopoly. 
  We define 
    F F F FF
F F
( )
( )
t t t t
t
t
P S s m s f
k s
                                             (4) 
  The solution concept of this model is subgame perfection. In the next section, we will give 
supplementary explanations of the model. 
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3. Supplementary explanations 
  First, we derive firm D’s reaction functions from (2). In the first period, since there is no 
inventory available, firm D’s reaction function is defined by 
    
1
1
D
1 1 1 1 1
D D D D F0{ 0}
( ) arg max ( ) ( )
S
s
R s P x dx m s P S s                         (5) 
In the second period, firm D’s reaction function without inventory is defined by 
    
2
2
D
2 2 2 2 2
D D D D F0{ 0}
( ) arg max ( ) ( )
S
s
R s P x dx m s P S s                        (6) 
and therefore its best response is shown by 
    
2 2 2 1
2 2 D F D D
D F 1 2 1
D D D
if( )
( )
if
R s s I
R s
I s I
                                        (7) 
  Firm D maximizes economic welfare with respect to D
ts , given F
ts . The equilibrium 
solution needs to satisfy the following conditions: When inventory is zero, the first-order 
condition for firm D is 
    D F 0
tP m P s                                                  (8) 
and the second-order condition is 
    F 0
tP P s                                                      (9) 
Therefore, we obtain 
    FD F
F
( )
t
t t
t
P sR s
P P s
                                               (10) 
In the first period, firm D’s reaction function is upward sloping. In the second period, firm 
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D’s best response also slopes upward for 2 1D Ds I . This indicates that firm D treats D
ts  as 
strategic complements.1 
  Next, we derive firm F’s reaction functions from (4). In period one, since there is no 
inventory available, firm F’s reaction function is defined by 
    
1
F
1 1 1 1
1 1 F F F F
F D 1{ 0} F F
( )( ) arg max
( )s
P S s m s fR s
k s
                                (11) 
In period two, firm F’s reaction function without inventory is defined by 
    
2
F
2 2 2 2
2 2 F F F F
F D 2{ 0} F F
( )( ) arg max
( )s
P S s m s fR s
k s
                                (12) 
and therefore its best response is shown by 
    
2 2 2 1
2 2 F D F F
F D 1 2 1
F F F
if( )
( )
if
R s s I
R s
I s I
                                      (13) 
  Firm F maximizes profit per capital with respect to F
ts , given D
ts . When inventory is zero, 
the first-order condition for firm F is 
    F F F F F F F F( ) ( ) 0
t t t tP s P m k Ps m s f k                            (14) 
and the second-order condition is 
    F F F F F F F( 2 ) ( ) 0
t t t tP s P k Ps m s f k                               (15) 
In addition, we obtain 
    F F F F FF D
F F F F F F F
( )'( )
( 2 ) ( )
t t
t t
t t t t
P s k P k s kR s
P s P k Ps m s f k
                       (16) 
                                            
1 The concept of strategic complements is due to Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer 
(1985). 
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Since F 0k , F F F 0
tk s k , so that F F F F F( )
t tP s k P k s k  is positive. This means that 
firm F treats F
ts  as strategic complements. 
 
 
4. Results 
  In this section, we trace out the firms’ reaction curves in the model described in section 2. 
There is no inventory available in the first period, and further 1is  does not affect 
2
is  and 
2
js . Firm D’s and firm F’s reaction curves in the second period is decided by the level of 1iI , 
and therefore we consider the second period. 
  We illustrate both firms’ reaction curves by using Figures 1-12. For explanations, the 
figures are drawn simply. We discuss the following four cases. 
 
Case 1: Neither firm holds inventory. 
Case 2: Only firm D holds inventory. 
Case 3: Only firm F holds inventory. 
Case 4: Each firm holds inventory. 
 
We discuss these cases in orders. 
 
Case 1 
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  Both firms’ reaction curves are drawn in Figure 1, where 2iR  denotes firm i’s 
second-period reaction curve with no inventory. Both firms’ reaction curves are upward 
sloping. The equilibrium is decided in Cournot fashion, i.e., the intersection of firm D’s and 
firm F’s second-period reaction curves gives us the equilibrium of the game. The reaction 
curves cross twice as depicted in Figure 1. Only point N  is a stable Cournot equilibrium, 
since in point N  firm F’s second-period reaction curve crosses firm D’s from above. In the 
remainder of this paper, we delete the superscript 2 for brevity’s sake. 
 
Case 2 
  This is the case in which only firm D holds inventory, and this case is illustrated in Figures 
2-4. We consider the change of firm D’s best response curve, which is drawn in Figure 2. We 
suppose that firm D maintains the inventory level of 1D
BI  in period two. By holding 
inventory, firm D’s best response changes to (7). Firm D’s inventory holding creates a kink in 
its reaction curve at the level of 1D
BI . Therefore, firm D’s reaction curve becomes the kinked 
bold broken lines. 
  From Figure 2, we see that the inventory level of 1D
BI  changes the solution of the game. 
The intersection of the reaction curves is an equilibrium solution in the second period. That is, 
if firm D holds 1D
BI , then the solution occurs at A . We see that economic welfare is higher 
at A  than at N , and A  is a stable solution. 
  We consider the situation drawn in Figure 3. If firm D maintains the inventory level of 
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1
D
CI  in the second period, then its inventory holding creates a kink in its reaction curve at the 
level of 1D
CI . The intersection of the reaction curves is an equilibrium solution in period two. 
That is, if firm D holds 1D
CI , then the solution becomes N . It is easy to see that N  is an 
unstable equilibrium solution. If firm D maintains the inventory level of 1D
CI , then there is 
no stable solution. 
  We consider the situation drawn in Figure 4. If firm D holds 1D
EI  in period two, then its 
inventory holding creates a kink in its reaction curve at the level of 1D
EI . In this figure, the 
reaction curves cross at two points. Both D  and N  are stable solutions. We see that 
economic welfare is higher at N  than at D . 
 
Case 3 
  This case is illustrated in Figures 5-7. Firstly, we consider the situation in Figure 5. We 
suppose that the firm F holds 1F
GI  in the second period. By holding inventory, firm F’s best 
response changes to (13). Firm F’s inventory holding creates a kink in its reaction curve at 
the level of 1F
GI . Therefore, firm F’s reaction curve becomes the kinked bold lines. 
  From Figure 5, we see that the inventory level of 1F
GI  changes the solution of the game. 
If firm F holds 1F
GI , then the solution is at F . However, we see that firm F’s profit per 
capacity is lower at F  than at N . 
  Secondly, we consider the situation drawn in Figure 6. If firm F maintains the inventory 
level of 1F
HI  in period two, then its inventory holding creates a kink in its reaction curve at 
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the level of 1F
HI . The intersection of the reaction curves is an equilibrium solution in period 
two. That is, if firm F maintains the inventory level of 1F
HI , then the solution becomes N . 
In this figure, there is no stable solution. 
  Thirdly, we consider the situation in Figure 7. If firm F holds 1F
JI  in period two, then its 
inventory holding creates a kink in its reaction curve at the level of 1F
JI . The best response 
curves cross at multiple points as in Figure 7. 
 
Case 4 
  This case is illustrated in Figures 8-12. In this case, both firms use inventory holding as a 
strategic commitment device. Firstly, we consider the situation in Figure 8. Suppose that firm 
D maintains the inventory level of 1D
BI  in period two. By holding inventory, firm D’s best 
response changes to (7). Firm D’s inventory holding creates a kink in its reaction curve at the 
level of 1D
BI . Therefore, firm D’s reaction curve becomes the kinked bold broken lines. In 
addition, suppose that firm F holds 1F
GI  in period two. By holding inventory, firm F’s best 
response changes to (13). Firm F’s inventory holding creates a kink in its reaction curve at 
the level of 1F
GI . Therefore, firm F’s reaction curve becomes the kinked bold lines. 
  The solution is decided in Cournot fashion. From Figure 8, we see that inventory holding 
by each firm changes the solution of the game. Figure 8 indicates that there are three stable 
solutions. 
  Secondly, we consider the situation in Figure 9. If firm D maintains the inventory level of 
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1
D
CI , then its best response curve becomes the bold broken lines, and if firm F holds 1F
JI , 
then its best response curve becomes the bold lines. In Figure 9, both firms’ reaction curves 
do not cross each other. That is, the obvious outcome is that there is no stable solution. 
  Thirdly, we consider the situation in Figure 10. When firm D holds 1D
EI  in the second 
period, its quantity best response curve is kinked at the level of 1D
EI . In addition, inventory 
holding by firm F kinks its quantity best response curve. Therefore, firm D’s best response is 
depicted as the thick broken lines, while firm F’s best response curve is the thick lines. The 
firms’ best response curves cross twice as in Figure 10. It is obvious that both N  and D  
are stable solutions. 
  Fourthly, we consider the situation drawn in Figure 11. Inventory holding by each firm 
kinks its quantity best response curve. If firms D and F hold 1D
WI  and 1F
TI  respectively, 
then firm D’s best response is depicted as the thick broken lines, and firm F’s best response 
curve is the thick lines. In this figure, the firms’ best response curves cross at multiple points. 
It is obvious that both N  and M  are stable solutions. 
  Fifthly, we consider the case drawn in Figure 12. We suppose that firms D and F hold  
1
D
WI  and 1F
JI , respectively. Therefore, firm D’s best response is depicted as the thick broken 
lines, while firm F’s best response curve is the thick lines. The firms’ best response curves 
cross four times as in Figure 12. We see that all these points are stable solutions. 
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5. Conclusion 
  We have considered a two-period mixed duopoly model in which there is a state-owned 
firm competing with a foreign joint-stock firm. Each firm is allowed to hold inventory as a 
strategic device. As a result, we have shown that there are multiple stable Cournot solutions 
in the international mixed duopoly model. 
  In the near future, we will extend our analysis by considering a mixed oligopoly model 
where a state-owned firm competes with both domestic and foreign joint-stock firms. 
 
 
References 
Artz, B., Heywood, J. S., & McGinty, M. (2009). The merger paradox in a mixed oligopoly. 
Research in Economics, 63, 1-10. 
Bárcena-Ruiz, J. C. (2007). Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: Price competition. 
Journal of Economics, 91, 263-272. 
Bárcena-Ruiz, J. C., & Garzón, M. B. (2003). Mixed duopoly, merger and multiproduct 
firms. Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 80, 27-42. 
Barcena-Ruiz, J. C., & Garzón, M. B. (2007). Capacity choice in a mixed duopoly under 
price competition. Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-7. 
Bös, D. (1984). Income taxation, public sector pricing and redistribution. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 86, 166-183. 
 14
Bös, D. (1986). Public enterprise economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., & Klemperer, P. D. (1985). Multimarket oligopoly: 
Strategic substitutes and complements. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 488-511. 
Chao, C. C., & Yu, E. S. H. (2006). Partial privatization, foreign competition, and optimal 
tariff. Review of International Economics, 14, 87-92. 
Cracau, D. (2015). The effect of strategic firm objectives on competition. In: Ohnishi, K. 
(Ed.), Firms’ Strategic Decisions: Theoretical and Empirical Findings, Volume 1 (pp. 
170-181). Sharjah, UAE: Bentham Science Publishers. 
Cremer, H., & Cremer, J. (1992). Duopoly with employee-controlled and profit-maximizing 
firms: Bertrand vs Cournot competition. Journal of Comparative Economics, 16, 
241-258. 
Cremer, H., Marchand, M., & Thisse, J.-F. (1989). The public firm as an instrument for 
regulating an oligopolistic market. Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 283-301. 
Cremer, H., Marchand, M., & Thisse, J.-F. (1991). Mixed oligopoly with differentiated 
products. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 9, 43-53. 
Delbono, F., & Rossini, G. (1992). Competition policy vs horizontal merger with public, 
entrepreneurial, and labor-managed firms. Journal of Comparative Economics, 16, 
226-240. 
Delbono, F., & Scarpa, C. (1995). Upward-sloping reaction functions under quantity 
competition in mixed oligopolies. Bulletin of Economic Research, 47, 341-346. 
 15
Fernández-Ruiz, J. (2009). Managerial delegation in a mixed duopoly with a foreign 
competitor. Economics Bulletin, 29, 90-99. 
Fjell, K., & Heywood, J. S. (2002). Public Stackelberg leadership in a mixed oligopoly with 
foreign firms. Australian Economic Papers, 41, 267-281. 
Fjell, K., & Pal, D. (1996). A mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms. 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 737-743. 
George, K., & La Manna, M. (1996). Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership. 
Review of Industrial Organization, 11, 853-860. 
Gunderson, M. (1979). Earnings differentials between the public and private sectors. 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 12, 228-242. 
Hey, J. D. (1981). A unified theory of the behaviour of profit-maximising, labour-managed 
and joint-stock firms operating under uncertainty. Economic Journal, 91, 364-374. 
Heywood, J. S., & Ye, G. (2010). Optimal privatization in a mixed duopoly with consistent 
conjectures. Journal of Economics, 101, 231-246. 
Kaplan, A. D. H., Dirlam, J. B., & Lanzillotti R. F. (1958). Pricing in big business: A case 
approach. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 
Lambertini, L., & Rossini, G. (1998). Capital commitment and Cournot competition with 
labour managed and profit-maximising firms. Australian Economic Papers, 37, 14-21. 
Lanzillotti, R. F. (1958). Pricing objectives in large companies. American Economic Review, 
48, 921-940. 
 16
Lin, M, H., & Ogawa, H. (2005). Cost reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market. 
Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-6. 
Lu, Y. (2007). Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly consisting of a single public firm and 
foreign competitors. Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-7 
Lu, Y., & Poddar, S. (2007). Firm ownership, product differentiation and welfare. The 
Manchester School, 75, 210-217. 
Lu, Y., & Poddar, S. (2009). Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly and private duopoly – 
‘capacity-then-quantity’ game: The linear demand case. Australian Economic Papers, 48, 
138-150. 
Matsumura, T. (1999). Cournot duopoly with multi-period competition: Inventory as a 
coordination device. Australian Economic Papers, 38, 189-202. 
Matsumura, T. (2003). Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a foreign competitor. Bulletin of 
Economic Research, 55, 275-287. 
Meade, J. E. (1972). The theory of labour-managed firms and of profit sharing. Economic 
Journal, 82, 402-428. 
Merrill, W., & Schneider, N. (1966). Government firms in oligopoly industries: A short-run 
analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 400-412. 
Mujumdar, S., & Pal, D. (1998). Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly. Economics 
Letters, 58, 199-204. 
Nett, L. (1991). R&D innovation in a mixed oligopolistic market. (Discussion Paper A-357). 
Bonn, Germany: University of Bonn. 
 17
Nett, L. (1993). Mixed oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Annals of Public and 
Cooperative Economics, 64, 367-393. 
Nett, L. (1994). Why private firms are more innovative than public firms. European Journal 
of Political Economy, 10, 639-653. 
Nishimori, A., & Ogawa, H. (2002). Public monopoly, mixed oligopoly and productive 
efficiency. Australian Economic Papers, 41, 185-190. 
Ohnishi, K. (2006). A mixed duopoly with a lifetime employment contract as a strategic 
commitment. FinanzArchiv, 62, 108-123. 
Ohnishi, K. (2008). Strategic commitment and international mixed competition with domestic 
state-owned and foreign labor-managed firms. FinanzArchiv, 64, 458-472. 
Ohnishi, K. (2009). Capacity investment and mixed duopoly with state-owned and 
labor-managed firms. Annals of Economics and Finance, 10, 49-64. 
Ohnishi, K. (2010a). Inventories and mixed duopoly with state-owned and labor-managed 
firms. iBusiness, 2, 116-122. 
Ohnishi, K. (2010b). Lifetime employment contract and quantity competition with 
profit-maximizing and joint-stock firms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 166, 462-478. 
Ohnishi, K. (2011). A quantity-setting mixed duopoly with inventory investment as a 
coordination device. Annals of Economics and Finance, 12, 111-121. 
Ohnishi, K. (2014). Sequential mixed competition with a foreign joint-stock firm. 
 18
International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Studies, 1, 38-52. 
Ohnishi, K. (2015a). Inventory holding and international mixed duopoly. Hellenic Open 
Business Administration Journal, 1, 73-89. 
Ohnishi, K. (2015b). Lifetime employment and a three-stage model with state-owned and 
joint-stock firms. In: Ohnishi, K. (Ed.), Firms’ Strategic Decisions: Theoretical and 
Empirical Findings, Volume 1 (pp. 155-169). Sharjah, UAE: Bentham Science Publishers. 
Pal, D. (1998). Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly. Economics Letters, 61, 181-185. 
Pal, D., & Saha, B. (2014). Mixed duopoly and environment. Journal of Public Economic 
Theory, 16, 96-118. 
Pal, D., & White, M. D. (1998). Mixed oligopoly, privatization, and strategic trade policy. 
Southern Economic Journal, 65, 264-281. 
Rotemberg, J. J., & Saloner, G. (1989). The cyclical behavior of strategic inventories. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 73-97. 
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (1998). R&D competition in a mixed duopoly under uncertainty and 
easy imitation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 26, 415-428. 
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2001). Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms’ moves: 
An irrelevance result. Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-5. 
Roy chowdhury, P. (2009). Mixed oligopoly with distortions: First best with budget-balance 
and the irrelevance principle. Economics Bulletin, 29, 1885-1900. 
Saha B., & Sensarma, R. (2008). The distributive role of managerial incentives in a mixed 
 19
duopoly. Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-10. 
Saloner, G. (1987). Cournot duopoly with two production periods. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 42, 183-187. 
Waldman, D. E., & Jensen, E. J. (2007). Industrial organization: Theory and practice. 
Boston, MA: Pearson/Addison Wesley. 
Wang, L. F. S., & Lee, J. Y. (2010). Partial privatization, foreign competition, and tariffs 
ranking. Economics Bulletin, 30, 2405-2012. 
Wang, L. F. S., & Wang, J. (2009). Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly. 
Economic Systems, 33, 389-396. 
Willner, J. (1994). Welfare maximization with endogenous average costs. International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 373-386. 
White, M. D. (1996). Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization. Economics Letters, 
53, 189-195. 
 20
 
 
 
   2Fq  
                                                           RF2      RD2 
  
  
 
 
  
                                                          N' 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
   
  
                         N 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
     0                                                                          2Dq  
Figure 1: The reaction curves cross twice, but only point N is a stable Cournot equilibrium. 
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Figure 2: Firm D’s best response is kinked at the level of 1DBI . 
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Figure 3: Point N' is not a stable solution. 
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Figure 4: There are two stable solutions. 
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Figure 5: Firm F’s best response is kinked at the level of 1FGI . 
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Figure 6: There is no stable solution. 
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Figure 7: There are two stable solutions. 
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Figure 8: There are three stable solutions. 
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Figure 9: There is no stable solution. 
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Figure 10: Both N and D are stable solutions. 
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Figure 11: Both N and M are stable solutions. 
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Figure 12: There are four stable solutions. 
 
 
 
